The Future of Europe : Lebanon

The Lebanonization of the West — and the Eastern Bastion Israel Cannot Ignore 

 

 

In this previous age, before the contemporary embrace of multiculturalism in the West, Europeans viewed cultures as distinct and qualitatively different from their own. Today, openly acknowledging cultural difference s is discouraged and stigmatized, making public discussion of such distinctions nearly impossible. Yet recognizing cultural differences does not inherently imply racial hierarchy. Sir James Tod, a British political agent in Rajputana, argued that several Indian cultures—particularly the Rajputs—were comparable in sophistication to the English aristocracy. Todd even petitioned the Crown to recognize the Rajputs as a people who had suffered misfortune but were culturally on par with the English aristocracy, arguing that elevating them would secure lasting allies in the region.

During the same era, Major Claude Scudamore Jarvis served as Governor of the Sinai Peninsula. Jarvis, fluent in Arabic and respectful of local customs, was reportedly well regarded by the Arab and Bedouin communities. Despite his rapport with the Arab and Bedouin populace, Jarvis held deeply critical views of the culture around him. In his books Yesterday and Today: Sinai (1931) and Three Deserts (1936), and again in a 1934 speech printed in the Palestine Post, Jarvis repeated that “the Arab is often called the ‘Son of the Desert’; it would be more correct to call him the ‘Father of the Desert’”, and continued that this figure “never plants; he only destroys”. After years of contact, Jarvis concluded that the culture he observed produced the very barrenness and desolation that surrounded it —a belief that placed it in stark opposition to his own British way of life.

Europe once acknowledged cultural distinctions; today it largely denies them - and the consequences are increasingly visible. As this cultural discernment has faded, many Western societies have lost a sense of their own civilizational inheritance and with it, the ability to assess which cultural groups align with or diverge from their own societal norms. The continent is not Balkanizing but ‘Lebanonizing’, entering the same structural trap that destroyed the state once known as ‘the Paris of the Middle East.’ Demographic change without political adaptation, parallel societies, and the erosion of state authority are now the defining features of much of Western Europe. From Israel’s point of view, it appears that the desert is spreading. But while the West is fragmenting, the East is resisting—and Israel must consider which Europe offers a more stable and reliable partnership.

The Lesson of Lebanon

The ‘Paris of the Middle East’ featured a large Christian population alongside major Sunni and Shia communities—making it one of the region’s most religiously diverse states. Christians constituted more than a third of its citizens, divided among several denominations. Despite its diversity, Lebanon functioned for decades under a confessional system that allocated political power and representation by religious affiliation. Inherent to this, each political party operated as an armed group, with its own affiliated militia. The system might have endured longer, but it lacked mechanisms to adjust political representation as demographic realities shifted.

 

 

 Following the 1948 War in Israel, many of the Arabs which fled settled in Lebanon, significantly altering the country’s demographic and political balance. This influx strengthened factions aligned with pan-Arab and Muslim causes and provided additional manpower to their militias. This culminated in the 1958 insurrection to overthrow the Christian president Camille Chamoun and join the pan-Arab, Muslim led, United Arab Republic led by Gamal Abdel Nasser.

 

 

 Lebanon’s political system failed to adapt to these pressures. And after the Palestinians had been expelled from Kuwait, because they supported Saddam Hussein’s invasion of their host, and after the Palestinians had been kicked out of Jordan, because of their attempt to overthrow the monarchy, the Palestinians relocated to Lebanon. Their arrival and addition to the Muslim forces in the country led to increased sectarian frictions, leading to the Lebanese Civil War.

 

 

Since then, Lebanon has been nothing more than a failed state. It suffers from weak state institutions, chronic political paralysis, and borders its own army cannot reliably secure. Lebanese factions have long relied on external patrons, turning the country into an arena for regional competition. The government of Lebanon effectively has no authority and lacks all capabilities to police its own borders or enforce its own legislation. While it was mandated that only the Lebanese Army and UNIFIL could carry weapons in South Lebanon, in practice, the official Lebanese Army as well as the global power of the UN operated either in coordination, or under the operational veto, of Hezbollah. This non-state actor also operates its own political party under the confessional system, allowing it to effectively captured the Lebanese parliament. While Hezbollah does not control the entire country, it maintains de facto authority in the Bekaa Valley and southern Lebanon and exerts substantial influence over Lebanon’s foreign policy. Other sectarian groups maintain their own militias, which patrol specific neighborhoods and regions. The central government’s authority is limited and uneven, with real power fragmented among competing political and armed groups. As a result, Lebanon operates through short‑term bargains rather than coherent national strategy.

Today, the societal structure of a multitude of European nations is already mimicking the Lebanese model and moving towards a similar fragmentation, sectarian friction, parallel societies, and weakened state authority.

Western Europe and its Emerging Enclaves

In recent decades, Europe has experienced significant immigration, including large inflows from the Middle East and North Africa. Recent discussions in Germany about potential repatriation of Syrian refugees have met resistance from Syrian authorities, who view these populations as a strategic asset. For now, it is clear that most will remain in Europe.

At the heart of the European Union, in the capital of Brussels, it was recently reported that the under-20 with a migration background represent 88% of the city. While that is certainly extreme, Belgians assure themselves that they are still in the majority, and will cite that nationwide, the migrant and migrant background population is only a third of the country. But this is not uniform. In the region of Flanders, the foreign population sits at roughly 29% and in the Wallon Region at 47%. This pattern exists across the continent.

 

 

In England, the foreign-born population is believed to be roughly 19% of the country, but in London that number rises to 40% - but that number only represents those who were born outside of the country. If the 1^st born generation of these migrants is included in that number, the foreign-background element in London sits at 63%. In Brimingham that population has reached 57% of the city, in Nottingham 43%, and in Leeds at 27%.

In France, that population sits at 23%, but in the capital of Paris it soars to 41%. In Marseille this foreign element of the city is 29% and in Lyon the population is 28%.

In Germany, the population with a migrant background of the population is 31%. In Frankfurt, 56%, in Munich, 46%, in Hamburg 36%, and in Berlin 39%.

In many cities, these communities form significant demographic blocs where they shape local politics. In France and the UK, several new political movements have emerged appealing to immigrant communities by mobilizing around and elevating foreign‑policy issues, notably Israel.

 

 

Analysts note that France has renewed its diplomatic engagement in the Middle East, though interpretations differ on whether this reflects geopolitical ambition or domestic political pressures. Either Paris is seeking to gain influence into the region as the US signals its retreat, or the domestic scene in France itself forces the country to turn more towards Mecca than to Rome.

The domestic doctrine of distracting the population by shifting blame to Israel is a widespread tactic in the Arab world, and this Arabization of domestic politics in Europe is already taking place. When France banned Israeli Defense companies in participating at Europe’s largest arms trade show as well as initiating an arms embargo, officials cited concerns about the Gaza conflict. A month later, Armed Forces Minister Sebastien Lecornu admit in a parliamentary hearing that France does not sell any significant equipment to Israel only because Israel is France’s principal competitor.

 

  

The phenomenon is also accompanied by a fracturing of the state’s authority and ability to govern. ‘No-go’ zones, where the state’s authority has evaporated, have been established throughout Europe. Most famously in Malmo, Sweden these areas in which local police forces have are barred entrance and have simply stopped policing, can likewise be found throughout England, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Germany. And while for a time these governments were adamant that such zones simply did not exist, they have now backtracked those statements and been forced to issue lists of the exact location of such zones.

 

 

 In addition to the vanishing of state authority across several regionally specific localities, the presence of these immigrants upon the European landscape is not without significant domestic strife. Across all these states, this new, largely Muslim, immigrant class has become the principle criminal element in all these countries, monopolizing the use of non-state violence.

 

 

 In Germany, a combination of Kurdish, Palestinian, and Turkish gangs have taken over the organized the criminal underworld of the country and are responsible for extortions, shootings, drug smuggling, and prostitution rings. England has been reeling from the Pakistani led gang rapes and grooming that has been run for the past 20 years. In Denmark, Palestinians outperform the criminal Danes in all aspects of crime. France, seems to erupt in riots on a nearly yearly basis and is now becoming accustomed to the occasional beheadings. The rate of rape throughout the continent has surged tremendously.

The governments of Western Europe have proven unresponsive, incapable, or acting in tandem with these developments. The British government on its part actively covered up the criminals who had been running, without exaggeration, the systematic raping of British youth. In response to all the other crime now plaguing the English metropolis, Mayor of London, Sadiq Khan, said infamously that terror attacks are simply ‘part and parcel’ of modern life.

 

  

 Naturally, political movements seeking stricter immigration controls have gained support across Europe, and actively seeking to reverse this reality. But, while their movements seem to have large popular appeal, they are routinely obstructed against by the parties sitting in power, in Germany, France, and England. Such scenarios only raise ethnic tensions further and increase the chances of Lebanon like sectarian violence. The precursors and factors of such violence are the appearance of geographically confined local majorities, the segregation and control of urban centers and industries by separate identitarian groups, and access to and the gatekeeping of relevant political institutions and structures. In many of these countries, the new immigrant class is the local majority in most urban centers, is catered to by the current political rulers, and the native populations demonstrate frustrations directed both at government and these new ethnicities. 

 

 

 Europe has not seen such a complex mosaic of competing identities since earlier periods of intense cultural and political fragmentation, like Spain prior to the Reconquista or the age of the Danelaw in England. Without major demographic and policy shifts—and given persistently low birth rates—Western Europe may face profound challenges to its cultural continuity and political cohesion.

Without major demographic and policy shifts and considering the native populations dismally low birth rates, Western Europe may face a fate worse than its Lebaonnization, but the extinction of its civilizations.

The Eastern Bastion

Eastern Europe’s demographic landscape differs sharply from that of Western Europe. Eastern Europe faces low birth rates, but unlike Western Europe, it has experienced far lower levels of immigration, reducing demographic pressures. Eastern European governments have generally adopted more restrictive immigration policies—shaped by historical experience, political culture, and security concerns—and place strong emphasis on cultural cohesion and national identity.

 

 

Consequently, many of the social tensions visible in Western Europe are far less pronounced in Eastern Europe. Eastern Europe has experienced fewer high‑profile violent incidents and less urban unrest and reports lower levels of the politically salient crimes that dominate debate in Western Europe. Notably, the region has not faced the kinds of high‑profile grooming scandals or crime waves that have shaped political discourse in parts of Western Europe. The migrants that do exist in these countries, often represent less than 10% of the total population (sometimes 2-3%) and are almost exclusively migrants from adjacent countries, like Russia. Surveys by Pew in 2019 show higher levels of trust in government and public institutions in Eastern Europe compared to Western Europe. The evidence of sectarianism growing is nonexistent.

Another poll indicated that Eastern Europeans express greater optimism about their economic future than many Western European. The residents across this region typically report a stronger feeling of national identity and social cohesion. By contrast, debates over national symbols in Western Europe have grown increasingly contentious, reflecting deeper cultural divides.

 

 

 Amid this environment, Eastern Europe hosts several of the EU’s fastest‑growing economies. Poland leads the growth of Europe at an expected growth of 3.6% of GDP by the end of 2026. Likewise, Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic are all similarly projected to grow from between 2.4% - 3.2%. Comparatively, the economies which have previously dominated the European marketspace, Germany, France, and the UK are each expected to grow each by 1%. These states cooperate through the Visegrad Group, which has become an influential bloc within the EU. Comprising of Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia the countries are looking to integrate their economies together, through joint infrastructure projects and building new energy corridors. One of the region’s major strategic projects is the Three Seas Initiative, aimed at improving north‑south infrastructure and energy connectivity, from the Baltic Sea to both the Adriatic and Black Seas. And in addition to this infrastructure project and the expected commercial wealth it might generate, their industrial capacity is vast. Poland’s industrial base includes major mining, manufacturing, and engineering sectors, supported by competitive labor costs. The Czech Republic possesses substantial mineral resources, including one of Europe’s largest lithium deposits.

 

 

 

As Western European politics becomes increasingly polarized over Middle Eastern issues, several Eastern European states have moved to strengthen ties with Israel.

The Czech Republic has reiterated its opposition to EU sanctions on Israel and has expanded bilateral cooperation in defense, cybersecurity, and technology. Furthermore, the country hosted an unprecedently large Israeli economic and defense delegation in the country, represented by over 50 Israeli firms and the government has expressed a desire to expand cooperation with Israel in cybersecurity, healthcare, and military procurements.

Hungary has consistently supported Israel within EU institutions, and its new leadership has signaled continuity in this stance.

Slovenia recently shifted its policy, lifting restrictions on defense cooperation with Israel and signaling a reset in bilateral relations. Within 20 minutes of taking office, the new Prime Minister ordered for the removal of the Palestinian flags from the Slovenian Presidential Palace.

Romania has been one of Israel’s most consistent allies within the Eastern Europe and maintained multiple defense pacts.

After the 2012 Burgas attack, Bulgaria deepened its security cooperation with Israel, particularly in counterterrorism and intelligence. Bulgaria is a major exporter of raw goods to Israel and cooperates extensively in the fields of counterintelligence and defense.

Overall, Eastern Europe shows few signs of the fragmentation affecting parts of the West. Public trust in institutions remains higher, societies are more cohesive, and economic prospects are comparatively strong.

 

 

Israel Moving Forward

The Muslim migration into Europe has held the attention of many Israelis for the better part of the past two decades. Had Europeans sought Israeli perspectives during this period, they would have encountered strong warnings.

Israeli commentators doubted that Western governments fully understood the long‑term implications of these demographic shifts or possessed the political will to manage them. Many Israelis predicted that demographic change would eventually reshape European foreign policy toward Israel. And they feared that the lack of Western knowledge and capability on the matter would ultimately result in the growth of the ummah, the joining of these countries essentially into the Muslim world and join the political and economic weight to the aid of Israel’s rivals.

Yet Israeli perspectives on these issues have been underrepresented in Western media, often dismissed and caricatured rather than examined. Had these warnings been taken more seriously, the fate of a Lebanonized Europe might have been mitigated. Regardless, these countries now face structural constraints that make rapid course correction difficult as many if not most seem to have passed the point of ‘critical mass’.

From Israel’s perspective, even a constant finger wagging Christian Europe is preferable than what it stands to become. But the path forward has largely been set by them and there is little that Israel can do to stop it. Israel must weigh these dynamics carefully. The EU remains Israel’s largest trading bloc, and Jerusalem cannot afford further diplomatic deterioration with major international actors.

Response to the West

Should these developments concern Israel? Certainly. Israel’s major European trading partners—Germany, the Netherlands, the UK, and Italy—are all experiencing political and demographic pressures that may affect long‑term stability and encourage political aggression towards Israel, complicating Israel’s strategic environment. Whatever trade that exists with these countries will certainly come under intense scrutiny in the coming years.

Yet in the near term, these trends may reduce the capacity of Western European governments to project power abroad. As the process of Lebanization continues in Western Europe, the ability of these governments to focus on foreign matters and apply actual resources to them will become increasingly limited. Their focus, as is the focus of Lebanon today, will largely be making short term agreements between the sectarian groups in their country simply to survive to the next day. Failed states, consumed by internal crises typically have limited ability to influence external affairs. Additionally, the threat that they might pose to Israel assumes that they will maintain their economic strength as it is today. History suggests that political fragmentation often undermines economic performance, reducing a state’s strategic relevance. While these countries Lebanize their economies will simultaneously rot.

One might ask whether these shifts could create opportunities for pro‑Israel political movements in Europe. Tommy Robinson is such a figure in England who would suggest as much. And there are likewise figures in the French opposition as well. However, such alliances are unlikely to produce durable strategic benefits. Periods of intense political polarization often produce movements hostile to multiple minority groups simultaneously, and if any of these parties is successful on their platforms of mass deportations, history suggests that it may likely target Jewish life just as much as it is to target Muslim life. The Reconquista came hand in hand with the Spanish Inquisition after all. Secondly, the embrace of any one group by Israel at this time would be viewed as meddling and likely have the opposite effects.

Such a zeitgeist in Europe could prove beneficial to Israel to a degree. Israeli politicians have consistently proposed harsher punishment of terrorism in the country, some suggesting the cancellation of citizenship or even the deportation of the terrorist’s family. If an era was to come when European powers were publicly advocating, pursuing, and enforcing mass deportations, Israel would certainly expect fewer international opposition to such laws being passed.

Over time, Israel should consider gradually reducing its diplomatic footprint in Western Europe, scaling back in states where political volatility limits strategic returns. The deals of a Lebanized country with hollowed out economies and dysfunctional internal politics are not worth the paper they are written on, and the budgets for those offices would be better applied elsewhere. Western Europe is undergoing deep cultural and political transformation, the long-term outcomes of which remain uncertain.

 

 

Response to the East

On the eastern side of the continent, the conditions for stable, long‑term partnerships with Israel are far more favorable. Eastern European states possess significant industrial capacity, natural resources, and growing technological sectors, making them attractive long‑term partners for Israel. They also face a direct security challenge from Russia and are accelerating defense modernization—an area where Israel can play a meaningful role. Many of these states are also cautious about Turkey’s growing regional influence, creating further alignment with Israel’s strategic concerns.

 

 

 A joint energy corridor linking Greece, Cyprus, and Israel could integrate seamlessly into the Three Seas Initiative, creating a major north‑south trade and energy axis. Linking these systems would transform the Balkans and Eastern Europe into a continuous trade and energy corridor from the Baltic to the Mediterranean. This would allow goods and energy to move efficiently across the continent without relying on Western European infrastructure. Such integration would reduce dependence on Russian and Turkish energy routes, bypassing the principal energy providers, and enhancing strategic autonomy for both Israel and Eastern Europe. In 2025, Greece, Cyprus, and Israel reaffirmed their commitment to linking their electrical grids. This Mediterranean partnership naturally aligns with the strategic ambitions of the Visegrad and Three Seas states.

 

 

Beyond infrastructure, their geographic exposure to both Russia and Turkey makes Eastern European states prime markets for Israeli defense systems. Their industrial capacity, workforce size, and available land also make them strong candidates for joint defense manufacturing ventures with Israel. Like Georgia, these states share concerns about regional security and seek reliable defense partners, positioning Israel as a natural collaborator, and the sharing of offensive and defensive weaponry with these countries should be a goal of the foreign ministry.

Among these states, Poland stands out as the most strategically significant. Poland is the region’s largest economy and a leading political voice within the EU on issues of sovereignty, security, and migration. Yet paradoxically, Poland’s bilateral relationship with Israel remains less developed than those of its neighbors. The public of Poland shares similar disapproval of Israel as other countries in Western Europe, but this might be mitigated with specific campaigns. Figures such as MEP Dominik Tarczyński have sympathy Israel, indicating potential political openings. Israel could also pursue symbolic cultural initiatives—such as supporting heritage restoration projects, or the construction of churches—to signal respect for Poland’s national identity. Thoughtful cultural diplomacy could help highlight shared strategic interests and foster greater public goodwill.

 

 

 Deepening Israeli participation in Three Seas infrastructure projects would further anchor Poland’s partnership with Israel. Significant investments would make it impossible for Poland to ignore Israel’s cooperation and assistance into the rise of Poland as a regional power and bloc. Looking ahead, if Israel reallocates wasted diplomatic resources from the West, shifting them toward Eastern Europe would yield far greater strategic returns. While the West fractures and splits, the East is emerging as a stable, strategically aligned, and economically dynamic partner.